We investigate how candidates’ willingness to apply responds to (potential) discrimination and rejection in a simulated labor market. Participants in our large online experiment are assigned to the role of either a recruiter or a candidate for a technical coding task, and apply with a non-blind resume that provides a coarse signal of skills alongside gender and age, or a blind resume that hides demographic information. We find that blinding increases the rate at which counter-stereotypical candidates apply. Our study goes beyond initial applications to examine the downstream effects of blinding when candidates receive feedback. We test two competing mechanisms: a discrimination channel, where perceived bias in non-blind rejections discourages future applications, and a quality-signal channel, where blind rejections convey stronger ability signals and induce greater deterrence. We find support for the latter channel. Blind rejections more strongly reduce future applications than non-blind rejections, particularly for women, muting the initial supply-side benefits of blinding.

How do political parties react to gender electoral policies? Using data from seven Brazilian municipal elections, we show that gender quotas and funding requirements change party incentives differently. Despite national-level compliance requirements, weak municipal enforcement enables strategic behaviour based on electoral competitiveness. In historical strongholds, the share of female candidates increased more after quota implementation than in competitive municipalities, driven by challenger parties. Conversely, strongholds reduced all-male lists 23.5% less than those in competitive races. The primary compliance mechanism is the fielding of token female candidates—younger, less educated, and single-time runners—with 40% of lists composed exclusively of men or men and token women. Funding requirements raise the cost of this strategy, leading parties to bunch at the quota threshold. Elected female candidates receive no fewer votes than male counterparts, pointing to party gatekeeping rather than voter bias as the key barrier to representation.

3rd ENS de Lyon – University of Bologna PhD Workshop, 8th Economics and Politics Workshop, CERGIC Internal Seminar, Gender Gaps Conference 2024, PSE-GPET Internal Seminar.